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LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES FOR MARITIME
TORTS
Walkley E. Johnson, Jr.*
The United States Government owns and operates by far the
largest fleet in the Americas. It is a fleet which includes not only
the high profile carriers, cruisers and destroyers but a miscellany of
tugs, barges, tankers, frigates, car floats and. lighters. It includes
cargo vessels as well as warships. Thus, the potential for the com-
mission of maritime torts is manifest simply from the number and
variety of government vessels at sea. Add the myriad responsibili-
ties exercised by Government agencies such as the United States
Coast Guard, and the potential for tortious involvement is enor-
mous.
1
In view of the extent to which Government vessels and activities
permeate both commercial and recreational maritime activity, it is
of no little significance to the maritime community that Congress
has elected to waive the Government's right to sovereign immunity.
The vehicle by which this immunity is waived, and the cornerstone
of the law governing the United States' liability for maritime torts,
is the Suits in Admiralty Act (SIA).2
JURISDICTION UNDER THE SUITS IN ADMIRALTY ACT
It should be noted at the outset that the scope of the SIA was
vastly expanded by an amendment in 1960. Accordingly, in cases
instituted prior to 1960, jurisdiction was frequently founded upon
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).3 Prior to 1960 the FTCA was
applicable in a number of maritime tort situations, but since the
Act expressly excepts from its coverage any action that might be
* B.A., University of Virginia, 1942; LL.B., 1948. Member of the Virginia Bar and Partner,
Crenshaw, Ware and Johnson, Norfolk, Virginia.
1. The Coast Guard, for example, performs such disparate maritime activities as the main-
tenance of aids to navigation, 14 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Cum. Supp. 1976); inspection and certification
of passenger vessels, 46 U.S.C. § 390a (1970); marking sunken wrecks, 14 U.S.C.A. § 86 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); search and rescue of persons and property in distress, 14 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); and ice patrol in the vicinity of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, 46 U.S.C. §
738a (1970).
2. 46 U.S.C. § 741 et seq. (1970).
3. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) (Cum. Supp. 1976), amending 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671 et seq. (1965).
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brought under the SIA,4 the broadening of SIA jurisdiction in 1960
necessarily restricted reliance upon the FTCA. At present, the juris-
diction of the SIA "extends to the full range of admiralty cases
which might have been maintained had a private person or property
been involved. . . .'
The broad range of situations in which the SIA affords jurisdic-
tion is not readily evident from a casual reading of the statute, and
it may be helpful to review the changes brought about by the 1960
amendment. The pertinent portion of the statute reads as follows:
In cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or if
such cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person
or property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be main-
tained, any appropriate nonjury proceeding in personam may be
brought against the United States or against any corporation men-
tioned in section 741 of this title.'
The effect of the amendment was to increase enormously the types
of cases that came within the purview of the Act. With the addition
of the language "or if a private person or property were involved,"
the Act encompassed situations involving not only vessels and cargo
but virtually any circumstance giving rise to admiralty jurisdiction.7
At the same time the deletion of the reference to merchant vessels
gave the Act sway over actions involving military and other public
vessels theretofore solely within the purview of the Public Vessels
Act.8
4. Id. § 2680(h) (Cum. Supp. 1976), amending 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (1965).
5. S. REP. No. 1079, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
6. 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1970) (emphasis added). The language italicized was added in 1960,
and at the same time the following language, which immediately followed the language
quoted above, was deleted: "as the case may be, provided that such vessel is employed as a
merchant vessel or is a tugboat operated by such corporation."
7. Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 1974). In Roberts, an action was
instituted by the heirs of an Air Force navigator who was killed when his plane crashed in
navigable waters on its approach to the Naha Air Base, Okinawa. The complaint sought relief
under the general maritime law, the Death on the High Seas Act and the FTCA. The trial
court held that jurisdiction was proper under the FTCA, but on appeal the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the action was maritime in nature and therefore jurisdiction could be
founded only under the SIA. Since the plaintiff neither had pleaded the SIA nor filed suit
within the Act's two year limitation period, the court indicated that the Government's motion
to dismiss should have been granted.
8. 46 U.S.C. § 781 et seq. (1970).
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From the changes effected in 1960, it is apparent that the types
of situations in which the United States may be sued under the SIA
are not intended to be less extensive than the types of situations in
which private parties could sue one another in admiralty.9 It would
also appear from section 3 of the Act10 that the principles of law
applicable to the Government in such situations are intended to be
identical to the principles applicable to controversies between pri-
vate citizens.
In practical application, however, serious questions arise as to
whether it is possible to draw a fair analogy between all activities
of the Government with those of private parties and also whether a
particular standard of care required of the private mariner can be
carried over into a remotely comparable situation involving Govern-
ment agencies. What, for instance, are the customs and usages of
the lighthouse trade or the search and rescue industry? How are
activities of a strictly governmental nature to be compared with
those in the private sector? Efforts of courts in dealing with this
enigma will be the principal topic of the remainder of this article.
Venue provisions under the SIA are reasonably straightforward.
The suit may be filed "in the district in which the parties so suing,
or any of them, reside or have their principal place of business in
the United States, or in which the vessel or cargo charged with
liability is found."" It should be noted, however, that under the
same section it is provided that "[t]he libelant shall forthwith
serve a copy of his libel on the United States Attorney for such
district and mail a copy thereof by registered mail to the Attorney
General of the United States, and shall file a sworn return of such
service and mailing."' 2 Failure to serve the libel "forthwith" is
deemed jurisdictional and bars relief.'3 The second and an ex-
9. See notes 7 & 8 supra.
10. 46 U.S.C. § 743 (1970).
11. Id. § 742.
12. Id. (emphasis added). It has been held that "forthwith" refers both to the mailing of
the copy to the Attorney General and to the service upon the United States Attorney. A delay
of four and one-half months in mailing a copy to the Attorney General was fatal. Battaglia
v. United States, 303 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1962).
13. In City of New York v. McAllister Brothers, Inc., 278 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1960), a petition
impleading the United States was filed on February 25, 1959, but service was not made on
the United States Attorney until April 27, 1959, nor was a copy mailed to the Attorney
General until April 29, 1959. Upon motion of the United States, the trial court dismissed the
1976l
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tremely important jurisdictional limitation is the two-year statute
of limitations provided in Section 5 of the Act. 4 The statute cannot
be waived, and there is authority to the effect that not even the
infancy, insanity or disability of the plaintiff will serve to toll the
statute.5
THE STANDARD OF CARE
If the suit is filed within two years and process has been "forth-
with" served, the plaintiff should then have an opportunity to prove
that his loss was proximately caused by the fault of the United
States. There are, however, hazards along the way, and the plaintiff
should anticipate some reluctance on the part of the judiciary to
open the public coffers to the same extent that a jury might tap the
treasury of a large corporate defendant."6
Since the SIA provides that the Government is to be judged based
on principles of law applicable to private parties in like situations, 7
the courts have often felt compelled to draw direct analogies with
private enterprise. But since the Government engages in many ac-
tivities which are unique, the analogies tend to be strained, and as
a result generally unfavorable to the claimant. The validity of the
analogies has been further taxed by the apparent belief of some
district and appellate courts that, despite the SIA's full waiver of
sovereign immunity, the United States is still entitled to a certain
degree of deference. Nowhere is this sentiment more evident than
in those cases dealing with the services provided by the Coast
Guard, and a review of this line of cases offers a good perspective of
the problems inherent in any attempt to establish the Government's
duty of care in an area in which it has virtually preempted the field.
The focal point of any discussion of the Government's duty of care
impleading petition. In affirming, the Second Circuit stated: "'Forthwith' means immedi-
ately, without delay, or as soon as the object may be accomplished by reasonable exertion."
Id. at 710.
14. 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1970).
15. The nonwaivability of this limitation was established in Isthmian Steamship Co. v.
United States, 302 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1962). The Second Circuit has held that not even the
infancy, insanity or disability of the plaintiff will serve to toll the statute. Sgambati v. United
States, 172 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1949).
16. There are no jury trials under the SIA. 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1970).
17. 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1970). See note 6 supra for relevant portions.
[Vol. 10:527
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in a maritime tort situation necessarily must be the Supreme
Court's decision in Indian Towing Co. v. United States,'" where the
Court provided the framework for defining the appropriate standard
of care in situations involving the Coast Guard's exercise of discre-
tionary functions. Prior to Indian Towing, the question had been
whether the Government could be liable at all in such situations;
after Indian Towing, the question became what standard of care was
appropriate under the facts.
The case arose as a result of the grounding of the tug Navajo and
the consequent loss of her barge's cargo. The plaintiff contended
that the grounding occurred as a result of the Coast Guard's negli-
gent failure to maintain the light on Chandeleur Island. The Gov-
ernment replied that the lighthouse service was a uniquely govern-
mental activity and that the provisions of the FTCA1 "imposing
liability 'in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstance. . . .' must be read as exclud-
ing liability in the performance of activities which private persons
do not perform. 20
In rejecting the Government's argument, the Supreme Court
pointed out that the statutory language is under "like circum-
stances," not "the same circumstances." ' 2' Thus, the Supreme
Court recognized that governmental activities necessarily differ
from those of private enterprise and that the waiver of sovereign
immunity contained in the FTCA should not be modified by the
exemption of governmental activities having no counterpart in
private industry. The Court went on to say that once the public had
come to rely on the light on Chandeleur Island, the Coast Guard had
an obligation to see that the light was properly maintained. In other
words, the Court suggested that the Coast Guard in this instance
18. 350 U.S. 61 (1955). The claimant in Indian Towing lost at each level before finally
prevailing on a petition for rehearing before the Supreme Court. The district court granted
the defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds that the United States had not consented to
be sued "in the manner in which this suit is brought." This action was affirmed by the Fifth
Circuit. 211 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1954) (per curiam). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 348
U.S. 810 (1954), and affirmed by an equally divided Court. 349 U.S. 902 (1955) (per curiam).
A petition for rehearing was granted, 349 U.S. 926 (1955), and, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme
Court reversed.
19. The language of waiver under the SIA is similar. 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1970).
20. 350 U.S. at 64.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
19761
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was similar to a "good Samaritan" who, having voluntarily under-
taken a service, was obliged to continue to perform "in a careful
manner."
22
Prior to Indian Towing, the decisions of the lower courts had been
notoriously paternalistic toward the Coast Guard. In P. Dougherty
Co. v. United States,2 13 an early case instituted under the SIA, a
divided Third Circuit went so far as to hold that "public policy
dictates that the United States should not be held liable for fault
of the Coast Guard in the field of rescue operations. '2 4 The court
reasoned that to hold the Coast Guard responsible for its negligence
would be detrimental to the morale and effectiveness of its person-
nel and would discourage immediate aid to those in distress. The
majority, however, gave little consideration to the intent of Congress
in granting a full waiver of sovereign immunity. Obviously, had
Congress intended that the Coast Guard constitute an exception, it
would have written an exception into the Act, just as it had provided
exceptions in the FTCA.
The dissenting opinion took cognizance of the provisions of the
SIA, recognizing that the Coast Guard was governed by the same
principles of admiralty law as the private citizen, and suggested
that the decision of the majority was influenced more by sentiment
than by an understanding of the intent of Congress.2 5 While the
position of the dissent was accepted in Indian Towing, the senti-
ment that swayed the majority to a decision favorable to the Coast
Guard has not been entirely absent from subsequent decisions.
22. Id. at 65.
23. 207 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1957).
24. Id. at 634.
25. The author of the opinion, Chief Judge Biggs, noted:
I cannot bring myself to believe that Congress, implicitly and sub silentio, intended
to relieve the United States for liability for the torts of Coast Guard vessels. In assert-
ing the contrary proposition I cannot help but believe that the majority is substituting
sentiment for the plain provisions of the Public Vessels Act. Id. at 641.42.
The suit was brought under the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. § 781, et seq. (1970), which
provides that "[s]uch suits shall be subject to and proceed in accordance with the provisions
of Chapter 20 of this title or any amendment thereof, insofar as the same are not inconsistent
herewith. ... Chapter 20 of Title 46 embodies the SIA, and the Court was, therefore,
obliged to apply those principles of law "obtaining in like cases between private parties." 46
U.S.C. § 743 (1970).
[Vol. 10:527
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THE PRIVATE SALVOR (GOOD SAMARITAN) ANALOGY
Although it was clear after Indian Towing that Coast Guard activ-
ities enjoyed no immunity, it was not entirely clear what standard
of care would be required of Coast Guard personnel discharging
discretionary functions. The Supreme Court had mentioned the
good Samaritan analogy, but it had not discussed in any detail the
extent to which the analogy might be applicable.
In Dougherty, which unlike Indian Towing involved an attempted
rescue at sea, the Court compared the Coast Guard's activities to
those of a private salvor voluntarily seeking to assist a vessel in
distress and suggested that such a salvor would be liable only for
gross negligence or willful misconduct. Later cases dealing with
Coast Guard rescue missions have continued to employ this private
salvor analogy, frequently using the concept interchangeably with
the good Samaritan doctrine.26 The majority of the decisions, how-
ever, has not adopted a standard of gross negligence but have held
that the Coast Guard discharges its duty of care so long as it refrains
from worsening the victim's situation.Y These decisions reason that
since the law provides that the Coast Guard may "perform any and
all acts necessary to rescue and aid persons and protect and save
property," 2 the Coast Guard, like a private salvor, has no duty of
affirmative action and will be liable only for active negligence re-
sulting in a distinguishable injury.
There is serious reason to suspect that such an analogy still con-
stitutes a hedge against a full waiver of sovereign immunity. There
are some obvious and substantial distinctions between the Coast
Guard and a private salvor which suggest that the Coast Guard
might have a duty of affirmative action. Private salvors, for in-
stance, are not charged with a statutory responsibility for maintain-
ing and operating rescue facilities.29 They are not afforded special
26. Although in rescue cases courts use the private salvor and good Samaritan analogies
interchangably, a private salvor is distinguished from the latter in that he expects a reward
for his services. GILMOR & BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY 532 (2d ed. 1975).
27. See United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1962); Frank v. United States,
250 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1957).
28. 14 U.S.C. § 88 (1970).
29. It should be noted that although the Coast Guard may not have a mandatory duty to
undertake a particular rescue mission, it does have a mandatory obligation to "develop,
establish, maintain and operate . . . rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on, under
and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." Id. § 2.
19761 533
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rescue training and equipment at public expense and do not publi-
cize themselves as providing rescue services. The noncontracting
private salvor is by definition a volunteer who is motivated, at least
in part, by the prospect of a salvage award. In contrast, it should
be noted that Coast Guard personnel are trained, equipped and paid
to render search and rescue services to the public.
These distinctions were fully recognized and discussed in United
States v. Gavagan.30 Although the suit in Gavagan was filed under
the FTCA prior to the 1960 amendment, the issue would have been
essentially the same under the SIA, that is, what standard of care
would be required of a private party under like circumstances. In
Gavagan the fishing vessel Donald Ray and her crew were lost in a
storm. A contributing cause of the loss was the negligent failure of
the Coast Guard Rescue Coordination Center in Jacksonville, Flor-
ida, to evaluate and disseminate information vital to the rescue ef-
fort. The Government made the usual argument that, in attempting
to assist the Donald Ray, the Coast Guard was acting as a private
salvor and, as such, was responsible only for "distinguishable" dam-
ages.3 1 The implication of this argument was that, since the Coast
Guard had no mandatory obligation to assist, it could withdraw
from the effort at any time, having no responsibility to follow
through with the mission to its conclusion.
The Fifth Circuit, however, rejected such an inflexible applica-
tion of the private salvor analogy 2 and indicated that if there must
be an analogy, "the situation is more comparable to that of profes-
sional salvors operating under contract without regard to success or
failure. ' 33 More importantly, the opinion recognized the futility of
attempting to analogize activities which are often uniquely govern-
mental to activities of private persons.3 4
30. 280 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1960).
31. Id. at 326.
32. Id. The application of the private salvor or good Samaritan analogy is often justified
as necessary to encourage rescue efforts. The absence of such a policy is thought to deter those
who might otherwise volunteer their assistance. The Gavagan court recognized that imposi-
tion of liability on the Government would not deter rescue operations as the vast machinery
of the Government was not put into operation because of the hope of reward but because of
policy determinations made by the legislative and executive branches of government.
33. Id. at 327.
34. Specifically, the court noted:
As our discussion has shown, what was undertaken here resembled private marine
[Vol. 10:527
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With Gavagan as precedent, it would have been reasonable to
expect the courts to accept the doctrine that Coast Guard personnel
must be held to that standard of competence which is reasonably
consistent with their training and experience, and the seriousness
of their endeavors. One is generally judged by the standards of his
profession, and in other areas of governmental activity it has been
recognized that public servants must discharge their responsibilities
in a manner commensurate with the extent of their training and the
nature of their undertaking. 5 But the more adaptable standards
suggested by Gavagan were short-lived. In United States v.
DeVane,3" the Fifth Circuit held in a split decision that Gavagan did
not alter the duty of care owed by the Coast Guard but actually
adopted the good Samaritan doctrine. The basis of this interpreta-
tion of Gavagan was a passage in which the court stated that "the
facts fully [met] the requirements of the good Samaritan doc-
trine." 3
It is difficult to read Gavagan in its entirety and not be persuaded
that the court interpreted the Coast Guard's responsibility as en-
compassing something more than an obligation simply to avoid
worsening the victim's condition. If the court had intended only to
adopt the good Samaritan doctrine, the vast majority of its opinion
was superfluous. As pointed out in the dissent in DeVane, the court
in Gavagan first applied the standard of reasonable care and then
stated that in addition the facts met the good Samaritan test.38
salvage in many ways. But it was something much more indeed. The Government may
not escape liability because we cannot find any private person either who had done so
or might undertake such a vast project for search and rescue . . . . Of course, to the
extent that the activity is the same as that normally done by private persons the law
(here the maritime law on salvage) would control. To the extent, however, that it is
different then the case does not fail because of a void in the legal precedents. The court
trying the case has the obligation to determine on appropriate standards what the law
would be were there such a private person performing the unusual function. . . .That
leads us then to the time-honored capacity of the federal judiciary in the realm of
maritime law to fashion and mold its substantive as well as procedural aspects. Id. at
327-28.
35. For example, it has been held that an FBI agent seeking to thwart an airplane hijacking
would be held to the standard of care expected of "the reasonable FBI agent with training in
handling such affairs." Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 1002 (6th Cir. 1975).
36. 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1962).
37. 280 F.2d at 328.
38. 306 F.2d at 187.
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The view expressed in the De Vane dissent has found support in
the First Circuit. In United States v. Sandra & Dennis Fishing
Corp.,3" a suit was instituted under the SIA by reason of the death
of five members of the crew of the Barbara and Gail, who were lost
when a Coast Guard patrol boat negligently towed the fishing vessel
onto a bar. In affirming the trial court's finding of liability, the court
stated:
In seeking exoneration the government makes much of the principle
that a salvor who is a 'good Samaritan' is not held to ordinary stan-
dards of care. Whatever may be the limits of this principle with
respect to volunteered salvage, we believe that if the Coast Guard
accepts a mission it should conduct its share of the proceeding with
acceptable seamanship. We refuse to take the government's view and
be a party to adding to the honored motto, "Semper Paratus,'"
[Always Ready] the words "Interdum Prudens" [Sometimes Care-ful].40
Thus in Sandra & Dennis the First Circuit held that the Coast
Guard had no obligation to undertake a rescue mission but that
once such a mission was undertaken the Coast Guard was obliged
to perform with due care. Unfortunately, there is no discussion as
to whether the duty of care is to be measured in terms of the stan-
dard expected of the week-end yachtsman or that of a Coast
Guardsman trained and experienced in rescue work.
THE NEED FOR MORE ADAPTABLE STANDARDS
With the exception of Gavagan and Sandra & Dennis, the deci-
sions involving Coast Guard rescue work seem to fall back too read-
ily upon the private salvor concept. They offer little discussion of
what Congress really intended when it provided that suits under the
SIA "shall be heard and determined according to the principles of
law and to the rules of practice obtaining in like cases between
private parties."' Can it be said that this language compels the trial
court in each instance to draw a specific analogy with private enter-
prise, or does it simply call for the application of the same general
39. 372 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1967).
40. Id. at 197 (emphasis added, citations and footnote omitted).
41. 46 U.S.C. § 743 (1970).
[Vol. 10:527
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principles of tort liability utilized in litigation between private par-
ties? Certainly, there are situations in which the Government's duty
of care should be commensurate with that of a private salvor, but
there does not appear to be any reason to apply the analogy so
inflexibly as to fail to take cognizance of the realities of the Govern-
ment's situation.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Government
engages in activities unique unto itself and that the waiver of sover-
eign immunity includes these uniquely governmental activities.4 2
The fact that this might result in the imposition of liability in un-
precedented situations should be no deterrent to the application of
ordinary standards of care.43 If it is recognized that the Government
will be liable for negligent acts incident to uniquely governmental
activities, it must also be recognized that there will be situations in
which governmental functions cannot be validly analogized to any
specific private undertaking. Such a situation could fairly be said
to exist with respect to the search and rescue activities of the Coast
Guard, which, with its training and experience and its network of
rescue coordination centers, scarcely could be compared to the good
Samaritan who comes upon the scene by accident, untrained and
uninformed.
It is not intended to overemphasize the decisions concerned with
Coast Guard rescue work; there are equally significant decisions
interpreting the SIA and involving agencies other than the Coast
Guard. In DeBardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States,44 the au-
thor of the Gavagan opinion analyzed the responsibility of the
United States under the SIA by reason of the publication of an
erroneous chart found by the trial court to be the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's damages. On appeal the Government argued that
publication of the inaccurate coast and geodetic survey chart was
analogous to the publication of an inaccurate road map or an erro-
neous scientific treatise and that there could be no liability in the
42. See notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text.
43. In Rayonier v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957), the Court noted:
It may be that it is "novel and unprecedented" to hold the United States accounta-
ble for the negligence of its firefighters, but the very purpose of the Tort Claims Act
was to waive the Government's traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort ac-
tions and to establish novel and unprecedented governmental liability.
44. 451 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1971).
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absence of a special relationship between the parties. The court
rejected the analogies and applied a standard of care which was
deemed compatible with the actual circumstances, taking full cog-
nizance of the fact that the charts were prepared and disseminated
with the knowledge that they would be relied upon by mariners for
navigation.45 The opinion is significant for its recognition of the need
to require of the Government a standard of care accordant with the
actual circumstances in which the particular agency is functioning.
Direct comparisons with private endeavors are neither necessary
nor, in many cases, possible.
LIABILITY FOR ABUSE OF DISCRETION
The original justification for the analogy between the Coast
Guard and the private salvor was the fact that most of the Coast
Guard's functions are discretionary. That is, the legislation author-
izing the Coast Guard to render aid to vessels in distress, mark
sunken wrecks and maintain aids to navigation is phrased in terms
of "may" rather than "shall," so that during the course of discharg-
ing these functions the Coast Guard is deemed to be charged with
less than the ordinary standard of care. Very little consideration has
been given to whether and under what circumstances the Coast
Guard might be liable for an abuse of discretion in failing even to
attempt a particular mission.
Indian Towing, of course, recognized that the Coast Guard had
no obligation to undertake the lighthouse service and simply held
that once it had elected to place a light on Chandeleur Island and
had engendered the public's reliance thereon, it was obliged to exer-
45. The court noted:
These are not just casual publications which may be of interest to or fall in the hands
of an indeterminate number of users. These charts are published by the Government
with the certain knowledge that they (i) will be disseminated through reliable channels
to ships and crews and (ii) will be relied on as accurate portrayals of the waters covered.
Indeed, this expectation is mandated as a rule of prudent conduct on the part of
shipowners. Sailing without a chart or with an obsolete one ranks as more than a mere
indiscretion. Many Courts have found such ships to be unseaworthy. Others have
found mariners who follow such practice guilty of 'glaring' or 'gross' fault. What the
maritime law exacts of shipowner [sic] through decisions of admiralty courts may
hardly be ignored by the Executive Agency responsible for such charts. The Govern-
ment must therefore bear the burden of using due care in the preparation and dissemi-
nation of such charts and notices. Id. at 148-49.
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cise due care to maintain the light in good working condition." But
a different situation is presented when the Coast Guard is informed
of a dangerous shoal, knows that vessels have repeatedly grounded
in the area and, yet, steadfastly refuses to mark the hazard with an
aid to navigation. Can the Government be liable for the agency's
abuse of discretion in failing to undertake the job at all?
The waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA excepts any
claim "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not
the discretion involved be abused. 4 7 The SIA, however, contains no
such exception, and nothing bars the imposition of liability solely
on the grounds of abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, it seems proba-
ble that the courts will be as slow to find an abuse of discretion as
they have been to modify the private salvor analogy. It is a theory,
however, that potential litigants should bear in mind. In undertak-
ing the lighthouse service, the ice patrol, the search and rescue, etc.,
the Government has preempted the field. Undoubtedly, these are
appropriate governmental functions, but they are also publicly-
financed services, the performance of which the public can expect
only from the Government. Accordingly, it does not seem unreason-
able that the Government be held responsible for any abuse of dis-
cretion in failing to undertake a particular mission.
46. 350 U.S. at 65.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970).
48. This view has received at least tentative endorsement by the Fourth Circuit in Lane
v. United States, Civil No. 74-2169 (4th Cir. Nov. 25, 1975).
Lone arose as a result of the foundering of a cabin cruiser when it collided with an un-
marked, submerged wreck in the Intracoastal Waterway in the vicinity of Pungo, Virginia.
The owner brought an action against the United States under the SIA, alleging negligence
on the part of the Government in failing to mark or remove the wreck pursuant to the
provisions of the Wreck Acts, 14 U.S.C.A. § 86 (Cum. Supp. 1976); 33 U.S.C. §§ 409, 414
(1970). At trial there was evidence to the effect that a number of pleasure craft had foundered
on this wreck and that the Coast Guard and Army Corps of Engineers had ignored requests
that the hazard be marked or removed. The trial court found that the United States had
breached a mandatory duty either to mark the wreck or remove it and rendered judgment
for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed as to the Government having a
mandatory duty but remanded for determination by the trial court as to whether the Coast
Guard had abused its discretion in failing to take corrective action. On remand, the court
held that the United States did abuse its discretion in failing to mark the wreck. Lane v.
United States, Civil No. 209-73-N (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 1976).
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CONCLUSION
Theoretically, the federal government is answerable under the
SIA for the commission of maritime torts to the same extent and
under the same principles of law applicable to private individuals
in like circumstances. In practical application, it is difficult to es-
tablish the Government's duty of care, since it is engaged in activi-
ties which have no counterpart in private enterprise. Strained com-
parisons, such as the private salvor analogy, applied so frequently
in Coast Guard rescue cases, do not reflect the very real differences
between the private volunteer and the trained professional. More
flexible standards, as suggested in Gavagan and DeBardeleben,
would appear to be compatible with the provisions of the SIA and
would produce a more just result.
Although many of the functions of government agencies giving
rise to maritime tort claims are exercised as a matter of discretion,
the SIA does not exclude liability grounded upon an abuse of discre-
tion, and this theory of recovery is one that might be expected to
find eventual acceptance by the courts and greater application as
litigants become more aware of the remedy.
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